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The Guilt of the "Innocent
Construction Rule" In Illinois
Defamation Law
Michael J. Polelle*
In this article Professor Polelle traces the origin of the peculiar Illinois "Inno-

cent Construction Rule" in defamation law and finds that the rule is a semantic
aberrationfrom an earlier Illinois "Reasonable Construction" or "Common Acceptation" Rule. He further concludes that the Innocent Construction Rule,
which had previously been rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court and which had
no firm precedential basis, was unfortunately resurrectedin John v. Tribune Co.,
a case in which the Illinois Supreme Court did not have the benefit of a full
briefing on the issue. His critical assessment is that the innocent construction
rule is distinguishable obiter dictum of the John case and is insupportable by
either logic or public policy. He calls upon the Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider the John case and stop the mischievous spread of the rule in Illinois Appellate decisions beyond even the original limitations of the rule. He urges that
Illinois rejoin the mainstream of common law defamation development by reinstituting the original Reasonable Construction Rule, which would restore the
jury to its proper role in a defamation lawsuit, or that the Illinois Supreme
Court at least limit the scope of the Innocent Construction Rule.

INTRODUCTION

Innocent or Reasonable Construction?
It was said of the Holy Roman Empire that it was neither
holy, nor Roman, nor an empire. It could likewise be said that the
innocent construction rule in Illinois defamation law is neither innocent, nor constructive, nor a rule. The essence of the so-called
innocent construction rule is that allegedly defamatory words are
to be read as a whole and given their natural and obvious meaning,
which for Illinois courts leads to the puzzling non sequitur that
allegedly defamatory words which are capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of
law.' This essential formulation of the rule logically means that in
* Professor of Law at John Marshall Law School where he teaches trial prac-

tice, tort law, and constitutional law. He received his J.D. degree from Harvard
Law School in 1963, practiced civil litigation law, and received his master of law
degree from John Marshall Law School in 1969. Professor Polelle sponsored a
pilot "Law For the Media" conference in March 1981. A current delegate to the
assembly of the Illinois State Bar Association, he has been appointed a professorreporter to the 1981 Illinois Judicial Conference by the Administrator of Illinois
Courts.
1. John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442-43, 181 N.E.2d 105, 108 (1962),
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a case where reasonable persons may differ regarding the defamatory or nondefamatory interpretation of the offending words, even
where the defamatory meaning may be the more likely or probable,
the defendant prevails as a matter of law in Illinois, without ever
standing trial before a jury of reasonable persons. Therefore, to

write of a state senator that he "poses as a Mason in good standing" or to call a woman a "slut" is not defamatory as a matter of

law in Illinois.' Also dismissible as a matter of law was a charge by
Westbrook Pegler in an article on Communist influence that a

noted plaintiff economist compared unfavorably with a person

Henry Wallace had "planted" in the Department of Commerce,
that the plaintiff was a "nudist" who had written disgusting books,

and that the Dies Committee had uncovered information about

"wild people who wormed their way into the government, including
many of the most malignant Communists in the world." The court
concluded that the words were sufficiently innocent so that they
were legally incapable of conveying to a reasonable reader that
plaintiff was a Communist or Communist sympathizer.
In the 1960's the so-called innocent construction rule required
that a jury of reasonable people could not possibly find defamatory
an article that accused an Italian art expert of making faulty identifications of alleged masterpieces even though the court did not
show how the rule applied to the facts or what the innocent concert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).
2. Campbell v. Morris, 224 Il.App. 569 (1922). Although not mentioned by
name, the spirit of the innocent construction rule seems clear. "The word 'pose'
does not convey the idea that the person referred to assumed a character for the
purpose of fraud or deception, while the word 'imposter' expresses no other
thought." Id. at 573.
3. Roby v. Murphy, 27 IIl. App. 394 (1888). Although not mentioned by
name, the spirit of the innocent construction rule again seems clear.
While such terms are coarse, vulgar, and brutal when applied to a woman, they do not amount to a charge of crime or of want of chastity, and
are not, therefore, in their common meaning, slanderous words. ...
What are slanderous words is a question of law and the jury could not
tell what were and what were not actionable words, and in any event it
was error to leave them to determine what were slanderous words (citations omitted).
Id. at 398.
4. Parmelee v. Hearst Publishing Co., 341 I1. App. 339, 343-45, 93 N.E.2d
512, 514 (1950). But cf. MacLeod v. Tribune Co., 52 Cal.2d 536, 343 P.2d 36
(1959) (demurrer against plaintiff candidate accused of being endorsed for office
by "Communist-line" newspaper was reversed). Infra note 136 and accompanying
text.
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struction might be.5 Furthermore, an article that accused plaintiff
of obtaining two "quickie divorces" and of abandoning "two teenage children" to a "state of siege" by not supporting them could
innocently mean that plaintiff simply obtained a fast divorce without fraud and that children who are eighteen and nineteen years of
age were technically too old to be the subjects of child abandonment so that plaintiff could not reasonably see himself as accused
of a crime or even as the subject of any ridicule or contempt.,
Likewise, a newspaper article which stated that plaintiff had been
jailed for housing violations and that a warrant of commitment
had been issued against the plaintiff "in lieu of $2,400 in fines for
housing violations" was nonactionable by law because the innocent
construction requires that a reader would be presumed to understand, not that plaintiff had been jailed, but that he would be
jailed only if the fine were not paid. 7 Equally fortunate was a defendant radio station which placed two chairs in a store window,
one chair bearing a price tag of $110 and the other a price tag of
$26.95, together with a placard stating: "County Building Architect
Allowed Supplier To Substitute This [the less expensive chair] As
Equal." Candidly conceding that reasonable people might draw a
different conclusion on the facts of the case, the Illinois Appellate
Court, nonetheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that by dint of the innocent construction rule, one had to
assume that the store window scenario called for harmless comparison of the relative beauty, utility, or longevity of the chairs rather
than an adverse reflection on the architect's professional competence for inadequately representing his client by allowing the sub5. Porcella v. Time, Inc., 300 F.2d 162, 167 (7th Cir. 1962).
I expressly refrain from joining in the application of the innocent construction rule as stated by the Illinois Supreme Court in John v. Tribune
Company, 181 N.E.2d 105, decided January 23, 1962.
Id. at 168 (Kiley, J., concurring).
6. Lorillard v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 65 11. App. 2d 65, 71, 76-77, 213
N.E.2d 1, 4, 6 (1965).
7. Reed v. Albanese, 78 Ill. App. 2d 53, 223 N.E.2d 419 (1966).
Although neither the text nor the headline makes clear whether Reed
was still entitled to avoid commitment by paying the fine or whether he
had defaulted in payment and had been committed, and although either
construction may seem reasonable if the innocent construction rule is not
applied, under that rule the article must be interpreted as not charging
Reed with having been committed.
Id. at 60, 223 N.E.2d at 423.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

stitution of chairs as equal in value when in fact they were not.,
In the 1970's the innocent construction rule continued in full
vigor. To write of the secretary of a Greek-American organization,
among other things, that he was "dishonorable", "deluded", and a

"liar", that he had an "avaracious craving", and that he attempted

"to conceal" the facts of an organizational activity, was not action-

able as a matter of law.9 The appellate court concluded that such
terms were not defamatory under the innocent construction rule.
"They did not imply that plaintiff was generally a dishonest person
or one who could not be believed under oath."10 Even more noteworthy is Watson v. Southwest Messenger Press" in which a

newspaper wrote of a traffic ticket scandal looming over the village
of Hickory Hills. The plaintiff mayor had allegedly ordered a
"ticket writing spree" causing the police to issue 130 tickets but

none of the violators paid fines because the mayor promised to
"void" the tickets. The newspaper also used the word "fix" in
reference to the voided traffic tickets. The appellate court affirmed a
summary dismissal of the case because of the innocent construction rule in the following words:

As defendants urge, the word 'fix' has many dictionary meanings.
It could mean the process of repairing, mending or putting in order, or it could mean an arrangement to obtain legal immunity by
social influence or even by payment of money. It could possibly
be construed as being synonymous with the word "void" which is
8. Turley v. W.T.A.X., Inc., 94 Ill. App. 2d 377, 236 N.E.2d 778 (1968). The
court stated:
If this view be in actual doubt, or if it might be said that ordinary reasonable people might draw different conclusions, we are bound to apply
the rule stated in John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105,
which holds that the allegedly libelous matter is to be read as a whole
and words given their natural and obvious meaning, and that where such
are capable of being read innocently they must be so read and declared
nonactionable as a matter of law.
Id. at 386.
9. Delis v. Sepsis, 9 II. App. 3d 217, 218-19, 292 N.E.2d 138, 140-41 (1972).
See also, Adreani v. Hansen, 80 IMI.App. 3d 726, 729, 400 N.E.2d 679, 682 (1980),
where the court construed innocently charges that plaintiff's attempted land sale
to the Northbrook Park District was a "disgrace" and possessed "characteristics
of pure greed." With a kind of unexpurgated capitalism the court innocently
thought such charges did not necessarily connote unfair dealing because all it
showed was the plaintiff simply trying to realize a profit on the transaction as a
valid business objective.
10. 9 Ill. App. 3d at 221-22, 292 N.E.2d at 142.
11. 12 Ill. App. 3d 968, 299 N.E.2d 409 (1973).
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also used in the article with reference to the tickets. In a situation
of this type, the law requires that we read the articles as a whole
and that the words used therein be given their natural and obvious meaning. Where the allegedly libelous words are capable of an
innocent construction, they must be read in that manner and declared nonactionable as a matter of law. (citation omitted)."3
Even where a jury had found it slanderous for an insurance
company officer to call the plaintiff, who was an insurance agent, a
"lousy agent" who allegedly spent too much money on furniture

and was inattentive to the interests of the company by not doing
what he was supposed to do, the appellate court and the Illinois
Supreme Court still reversed the judgment for plaintiff as a matter

of law because of the innocent construction rule.13 In another case,

the plaintiff, Billy Kirk, sued the village of Hillcrest because the
village president said someone had used a master key to remove
papers from his desk. The village president also said:
In fact, they took the plat showing the lots we are being sued over
and I went to BILLY KIRK and, believe it or not, he gave them
back. We are stripped of everything." '

But the court found no cause of action because of the innocent

construction rule. Where a male employee was dismissed because
he allegedly made "sexual advances" against a female co-worker,

the appellate court applied the innocent construction rule to the
concept of "sexual advances." 15 The appellate court also concluded
12. Id. at 973, 299 N.E.2d at 413 (1973). Query: Would the reasonable urban
dweller, even in his most innocent fantasy, ever think of scotch tape rather than
his wallet when the phrase "to fix a traffic ticket" is uttered?
13. Valentine v. North American Co. for Life and Health Ins., 16 Ill. App. 3d
277, 305 N.E.2d 746 (1973), aff'd, 60 Ill. 2d 168, 328 N.E.2d 265 (1974). "The
statement in context does not necessarily imply plaintiff's lack of qualifications or
skill in his calling. Under the innocent construction rule we must as a matter of
law declare that these words are not slanderous per se." 60 Ill. 2d at 171-72, 328
N.E.2d at 267.
14. Kirk v. Village of Hillcrest, 31 Ill.
App. 3d 1063, 335 N.E.2d 535 (1975).
We may just as logically conclude that Billy Kirk never intended or was
completely unaware of, the activities of the person who abstracted the
papers from the defendant's desk and that he never intended to keep the
papers, as that he committed or abetted the commission of burglary. The
words complained of are clearly capable of an innocent construction and
fall within the rule of the John case enunciated above.
Id. at 1066, 335 N.E.2d at 538.
15. Roemer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 606, 323 N.E.2d 582 (1975).
The words might be construed to describe generally accepted social con-
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that the complaint was equally insufficient where a plaintiff build.
ing commissioner claimed defendants had defamed him by alleging
plaintiff was "attempting to extort and get money for Berkeley Little League by refusing to authorize building permits so that Walgreen's cannot continue with its remodeling and expansion of its
warehouse, unless Walgreen's donates money to Berkeley Little
League.""' Why? Because the word "extortion" did not accuse
plaintiff of a crime or of unfitness for office if innocently construed.1 7 Likewise, the plaintiff, a chief deputy clerk of court, who
was called a "political hack" hired in place of office modernization,
had no case because the charge construed innocently did not impugn plaintiff's job performance. 8 And it was not actionable to call
plaintiffs who did remodeling work without a permit "rip-off speculators" because under the innocent construction rule the lack of a
permit did not constitute moral turpitude, nor did it involve a
prison sentence. The phrase "rip-off speculators" could mean simple noncriminal economic exploitation. 9
Opposing the innocent construction rule is a reasonable construction rule which has also been called the "common mind
rule"' or "test of reasonableness. '"2" A long line of Illinois cases
had formerly adopted the reasonable construction rule under what
was called the "common acceptation" doctrine.22 The common deduct such as a gesture or wink or even the use of words with double
meaning as a form of jest. In view of the complete ambiguity of the
phrase as used in the complaint we are obliged to accept and apply an
innocent construction.

Id. at 612, 323 N.E.2d at 586-87.
16. Bougadis v. Langefeld, 69 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1011, 387 N.E.2d 965, 966

(1979).
17. Id. at 1014, 387 N.E.2d at 968.

18. Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 50 Ill. App. 3d 247, 249, 365 N.E.2d
744, 745-46 (1977).

19. Bruck v. Cincotta, 56 Ill.
App. 3d 260, 264-65, 371 N.E.2d 874, 878-79

(1977).

20. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So.2d 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
21. "The test of 'reasonableness' guides and directs the court in its function

of deciding whether it is open to a jury in any particular case to hold that reasonable persons would understand the word complained of in a defamatory sense."
Per Lord Morris in Jones v. Skelton, [1963] 1 W.L.R. at 137, as reported in C.
GATLEY, LIBEL

AND SLANDER §

119, at 64 (7th ed. 1974).

22. The established rule in this state is that the words in an action of
libel must be taken in the sense which the readers of common and reasonable understanding would ascribe to them, that is, in their ordinary or

common acceptation. (Nelson v. Borchenius, 52 Ill. 236; Barnes v. Har-
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nominator of this reasonable construction rule is that allegedly defamatory words are to be interpreted in the same sense in which
they are reasonably understood and are assumed to have the
meaning ordinarily given to them by persons familiar with the language. 2s The only function of the court is to determine at the outset, from the viewpoint of the average reasonable hearer or reader,
whether the words are reasonably capable of a defamatory interpretation. If the words are capable of a defamatory interpretation,
even though they may reasonably be susceptible of an innocent interpretation as well, the case should go to the jury to then determine whether, in fact, the average reasonable hearer or reader understood the words in the innocent sense or in the defamatory
sense.' 4 This reasonable construction rule, therefore, allows the
jury to hear what would never be heard by a jury in Illinois. In
following the innocent construction rule, Illinois judges almost
5
stand alone among the courts of the United States.2 Even in remon 71 Ill. 609; Ranson v. McCurley, 140 111. 626).
People v. Fuller, 238 Ill. 116, 124, 87 N.E. 336, 338 (1909). See also, e.g., Schmisseur v. Kreilich, 92 Ill. 347, 351-52 (1879); Pfitzinger v. Dubs, 64 F. 696, 697-98
(7th Cir. 1894); Herhold v. White, 127 Ill. App. 48, 53 (1906); People v. Strauch,
247 Ill. 220, 232, 93 N.E. 116, 131 (1910); Willfred Coal Co. v. Sapp, 193 Ill. App.
400 (1915); Belt v. Tribune Co., 6 Il. App. 2d 489, 493, 128 N.E.2d 638, 640
(1955).
23. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 747 (4th ed. 1971)
and F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.4, at 362 (1956).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 614 (1977). "In some cases imputations are so clearly innocent or so clearly defamatory that the court is justified in
determining the question itself. On the other hand, if, in the opinion of the court,
the question is one on which reasonable men might differ, it is for the jury to
determine which of the two permissible views they will take." Id. comment (d) at
316. Accord, F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.29, at 464 (1956) and
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 747-48 (4th ed. 1971). For
English scholarly authority also supporting this view, see H. STREET, THE LAW OF
TORTS 295 (6th ed. 1976) and SALMOND, THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 145-47 (17th
ed. 1977). Fox's Libel Act of 1792 was passed in England precisely to prevent
judges in criminal libel trials from usurping the function of the jury by deciding
for themselves whether the words were defamatory so as to use the law of seditious libel to harass proponents of political views. The Act has long been regarded
as applicable to civil defamation cases as well. English judges retain the power to
withdraw a case from the jury only if no reasonable man could regard the words
as defamatory. See P. WINFIELD & J. JOLOWiCZ, LAW OF TORTS 284-85 (11th ed.
1979).
25. For those few sister states also espousing the innocent construction rule,
see Monnin v. Wood, 86 N.M. 460, 525 P.2d 387 (1974); Walker v. Kansas City
Star, 406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1966); and Becker v. Toulmin, 105 Ohio St.
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cent times an overwhelming majority of courts have rejected the
innocent construction rule and have instead adopted in one form
or another the reasonable construction rule.2 6 Indeed, Prosser has
traced the historical antecedents of this innocent construction rule
to a "set of artificial and absurd rules of pleading and proof" that
reflected the hostility of early common law courts to defamation
actions.2"
Nineteenth Century Precedent: A Surprise
The assurance with which contemporary Illinois courts invoke
549, 138 N.E.2d 391 (1956). Accord, England v. National Canteen Co. of America,
349 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1956). But see Anton v. St. Louis Suburban Newspapers,
598 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). Montana also appears to follow a version of
the innocent construction rule by requiring that the only meaning of the words
must be defamatory before the words can ever be libel per se. Steffes v. Crawford,
143 Mont. 43, 386 P.2d 842 (1963).
26. The United States Supreme Court adopted a reasonable construction rule
in Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290 (1919). Accord, Gearhart v.
WSAZ, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 1957); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l.,
205 F. Supp. 56 (W.D. Va. 1962); Local 15, Independent Workers v. IBEW, 273 F.
Supp. 313 (N.D. Ind. 1967); Kihneman v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 312 F.
Supp. 34 (E.D. La. 1979); Treutler v. Meredith Corp., 455 F.2d 255 (8th Cir.
1972); Jones v. Dist. VIII Planning Council, 492 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1980);
and Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp. 893 (W.D.
Mich. 1980). For state court decisions following the reasonable construction rule
since the 1960's see Terry v. Hubbell, 22 Conn. Supp. 248, 167 A.2d 919 (1960),
William v. Daily Review, Inc., 236 Cal.2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Dist. Ct. App.
1965); Jones v. Walser, 107 N.H. 379, 222 A.2d 830 (1966); Western States Title
Ins. Co. v. Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316 (1966); State v. Haider, 150
N.W.2d 71 (N.D. 1967); James v. Garner, 250 S.C. 479, 158 S.E.2d 909 (1968);
Amsbury v. Coules Publishing Co., 76 Wash. 2d 733, 458 P.2d 882 (1969); Corab v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971); Taylor v. Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co., 473 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Wolfson v. Kirk,
273 So.2d 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Montgomery v. Pacific & Southern Co.,
131 Ga. App. 712, 206 S.E.2d 631 (1974); D.R.W. Corp. v. Cordes, 65 Wis.2d 303,
222 N.W.2d 671 (1974); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 543 P.2d 1356
(Hawaii 1975); Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va.
1975); James v. Gannett, 40 N.Y.2d 415, 353 N.E.2d 834, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1976);
Gray v. WALA-TV, 384 So.2d 1062 (Ala. 1980). For state cases before the 1960's
see, e.g., Van Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News Co., 203 Mich. 570, 170 N.W. 93 (1918);
Wadach v. Benton County Co-op Assoc., 236 Minn. 507, 53 N.W.2d 230 (1952);
Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, 196 Va. 1, 82 S.E.2d 588 (1954); Tennyson v.
Werthman, 167 Neb. 208, 92 N.W.2d 559 (1958).
27. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 747 (4th ed.
1971). See Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 78 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71, 397 N.E.2d 41,
44 (1979) (mitior sensus).
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the innocent construction rule, especially when they claim that the
rule in Illinois is a firm one established "for over 100 years,"', is
not one that will bear close scrutiny. In 1842, the Illinois Supreme
Court in McKee v. Ingalls29 rejected the doctrine of mitior sensus
which required allegedly defamatory words to be interpreted in
their milder sense. Instead, the court acknowledged a "common
sense rule" that "words are to be taken and understood in their
common acceptation.' 0 Only where the words would bear an
equally defamatory or nondefamatory meaning should a court then
look to the subjective intent of the defendant in speaking them.
The court, therefore, affirmed a verdict for the defendant, even
though the defendant had called the plaintiff "a damned thief."
The court held that it was proper to instruct the jury in this slander case that if the words were spoken in the heat of passion without intent to accuse anyone of stealing personal property, the jury
must find for the defendant.' 1 There is no doubt that in this first
Illinois Supreme Court opinion the prototype of the innocent construction rule was clearly rejected. The only obscurity was whether
the court was adopting a completely objective standard of what the
words would mean to a third party, a completely subjective standard of whether the defendant intended to defame the plaintiff, or
more likely, some combination of both standards. But neither standard presupposes in any way that the words must be given the
milder or more innocent meaning.
In Nelson v. Borchenius," another slander case almost thirty
years later, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed that defamatory
words should be interpreted according to the meaning that "men
of common and reasonable understanding" would ascribe to them.
28. Altman v. Amoco Oil Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 104, 107, 406 N.E.2d 142, 144
(1980).
29. 5 Ill. 30 (1842). Infra note 158 where the innocent construction rule is
identified with the doctrine of mitior sensus in Illinois.
30. Id. at 33.
31. Id. Accord, Winchell v. Strong, 17 Ill. 597, 602 (1956) where the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded in a slander case that a conversation held by defendant
shortly after he accused the plaintiff of "stealing lumber" should have been admitted into evidence to ascertain "the real intention of the defendant when he
used the words charged."
32. 52 Ill. 236 (1869). Accord, Barnes v. Hamon, 71 Ill. 609, 611 (1874) where
the court affirmed a slander verdict for the plaintiff by holding that the words "he
burned the house" could be taken by "men of common and reasonable understanding" to impute actionable per se allegation of arson. See also Miller v. Johnson, 79 Ill. 58 (1875).
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In upholding a verdict for a plaintiff who had been called "a villain, a rascal and a cheater," .the court concluded that it was not
error to let witnesses testify that they understood the words to refer to plaintiff's business as a merchant. 8 Not only did Nelson reject what later came to be known as the innocent construction rule
but it opted for the proposition that the test of this "common and
reasonable understanding" is not what the defendant intended but
what a reasonable hearer of the words would understand. Six years
after Nelson, the Illinois Supreme Court again affirmed a slander
verdict for plaintiff on the ground that the defendant could not
excuse his liability by claiming that he did not intend to use the
words in the sense that bystanders who heard them would presumptively have interpreted them to mean. 8 '
Had there been any doubt about the status of the so-called
innocent construction rule after these early Illinois cases, it should
have been put to rest by the Illinois Supreme Court decision of
Schmisseur v. Kreilich8 in 1879. The gravamen of plaintiff's
charge against the defendant in that case was that the defendant
had slandered the woman plaintiff by saying of plaintiff in French:
"Elle a fait la putaine (She has acted or made the whore)." In
affirming a verdict for plaintiff, the court flatly rejected the argument that an allegation of whoring did not impute the crime of
fornication. The court instead stated:
It is not required, nor is it allowable, that we shall put a strained
construction on words to relieve the slanderer from a just responsibility. The words are to be construed according to their common
acceptation, and, according to common acceptation, to say of a
woman that she has "acted the whore" is equivalent to charging
her with that conduct that characterizes a "whore"-that is to
say, that she has been guilty of fornication or adultery, accordingly as she was married or single when guilty of that conduct.3"

It was clear after these cases, therefore, that the Illnois Supreme
Court had rejected the use of what we now call the innocent construction rule, not merely in determining whether the words of a
slander case were defamatory on their face, but also in the more
33. 52 Ill. at 237-38.
34. 79 Ill. 58 (1875). Accord, Flagg v. Roberts, 67 Il. 485 (1873).
35. 92 111. 347 (1879).
36. 92 Ill. at 351-52 (1879). Cf. Elam v. Badger, 23 Ill. 445 (1860) (unmarried
woman accused of being "screwed": common acceptation rule) and Burke v. Stewart, 81 111. App. 506 (1898) (married woman called a "whore": common acceptation rule).
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serious task of determining whether the defamation fell within one
of the traditional slander per se categories of the common law that
would render the slander actionable per se without the necessity of
7
alleging and proving special damages.8
By adopting the "common acceptation" rule in distinguishing
actionable slander per se imputation from slander per quod where
special damages would be required at common law, the Illinois Supreme Court could not have more clearly uprooted any vestige of
the innocent construction rule. The movement away from any innocent construction rule is further indicated by the decision to
adopt the interpretation placed upon the words by an average bystander of reasonable understanding, rather than the subjectively
intended interpretation of the defendant.
The first flyspeck of a distortion in this solid phalanx of Illinois Supreme Court precedent occurred at the appellate level in
Young v. Richardson," decided together with the Schmisseur decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in the June term of 1879. The
defendant in Young, a taxpayer of Kankakee County, was sued in
libel for reporting to the county board of supervisors that the
plaintiff, a state's attorney, had falsely inflated his criminal conviction rate. The appellate court reversed the jury award for plaintiff
and in the course of the reversal conjectured that the state's attorney was simply mistaken in reporting his conviction rate rather
than guilty of intentionally perjuring himself in order to increase
his fees. The court then stated:
It is a principle of law that "words alleged to be libelous will receive an innocent construction if they are fairly susceptible of it."
Cooley on Torts, page 208, and cases cited therein.5s
But this was clearly obiter dictum. The Young court reversed the
jury verdict solely due to the variance of proof from the declara37. Illinois common law provides for five classes of words which give rise to
an action for slander. Those imputing the commission of a criminal offense, those
imputing infection with a communicable disease tendinj to exclude one from society, those imputing inability to perform the duties of an office or employment or
want of integrity in the performance thereof, and those prejudicing a person in his
profession or trade are all actionable as slander per se without proof of special
damages. All other slanderous words are per quod and therefore require an allegation and proof of special damages. Wright v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 281 Ill. App.
495, 498 (1935). Accord, Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp., 59 Ill. App. 2d 337,
340-41, 207 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1965).
38. 4 Ill. App. 364 (1879).
39. Id. at 374.
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tion filed by plaintiff and the error of the trial court in excluding
defendant's conditional privilege of reporting the matter to a public board. Indeed, the court agreed that in the case before it the
question of defamatory meaning was properly left to the jury because of the uncertainty of the defamatory implication.'0 Neither
the court nor the pro se parties cited any primary Illinois authority
and in fact totally ignored the prior Illinois Supreme Court decisions adopting the "common acceptation" rule. Most suspicious is
the appellate court's incomplete citation from Cooley. Cooley actually said: "Words alleged to be libelous will receive an innocent
construction if they are fairly susceptible of it, and when it is uncertain whether they convey a defamatory imputation the question is one for the jury" (emphasis added).' The attempted insinuation of an innocent construction rule in the Young libel case may
have been due to the appellate court's concern for libel defendants
at a time in Illinois law when all libel was actionable per se, unlike
the law of slander, and, therefore, special damages never had to be
proved once the language was found defamatory by the jury."
The anomaly of the Young decision is accentuated by the uniform adherence of subsequent Illinois Appellate Court decisions to
the reasonable construction rule throughout the remainder of the
nineteenth century. In 1881 the court reiterated that the essence of
the injury in a slander case is the effect created by the slander
40. "In this cause we think it is fairly a question for the jury, and the ques-

tion of the meaning of the publication should have been left to the jury under a
proper instruction by the court." Id.
41. T. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS, "Truth as a Defense," 208 (1879).
42. Cerveny v. News Co., 139 Ill. 345, 28 N.E. 693 (1891). Accord Pfitzinger v.
Dubs, 64 F. 696 (7th Cir. 1894), and Herrick v. Tribune Co., 108 111. App. 244, 248
(1903) (questioning distinction between libel per se and slander per se but holding
the rule was "well established."). This view that all libel is actionable per se crops
up later as well. See, e.g., Eggleston v. Whitlock, 242 Ill. App. 379 (1926) and
Cowper v. Vannier, 20 Ill. App. 2d 499, 156 N.E.2d 761 (1959). "The rule is, that
written or printed words are libelous per se, if clearly defamatory on their face
and are unambiguous and incapable of an innocent meaning (citations omitted)."
Cowper v. Vannier, 20 Ill. App. 2d at 501, 156 N.E.2d at 762. The Cowper court
and the authorities on which it relies seem determined to restrict the potentially
broad scope of a doctrine requiring all libel to be per se by smuggling into libel
cases a rigid innocent construction rule. But such a peculiar justification in libel
cases is no longer valid, if it ever was, because actionable libel per se, without
allegation and proof of special damages, is now practically restricted to those written words which would be classified as slander per se had they been spoken. See
cases infra note 86.
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upon the minds of the hearers.4 3 In 1882, while reversing a demurrer granted defendant in a slander case, the appellate court concluded: "In actions for slander and libel, the rule no longer is, that
words are to be understood in mitiori sensu, but they are to be
taken according to their plain and natural import."" A slander

case of 1886 noted that "the language used must be read and interpreted as it would ordinarily be understood, when heard by the
person who knew the circumstances set out."'" The 1886 case further determined that even where words are not defamatory on
their face, but only reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, the case should be left to the jury to decide whether under all
the circumstances the bystanders understood them in the defamatory sense.46 In 1891, the appellate court in Jackson V. Will Journal Co. v. Beymer,'7 extended the reasonable construction rule of
Nelson v. Borchenius48 to a libel case by affirming a jury verdict
for the plaintiff in the following words: "But if the language is ambiguous only, capable of being understood in a double sense, one
very damaging, the other comparatively harmless, the publisher
' 49
cannot object that his readers gave it the sinister meaning." In

1894, the appellate court, again in a slander case, held that allegedly defamatory words must be construed in the sense in which
hearers of common understanding would understand the words,
and that, therefore, witnesses to the allegedly defamatory outburst
could properly be interrogated at trial about the sense in which
App. 265, 269 (1881) ("Hallett swore a God
43. Foval v. Hallet, 10 Ill.
damned lie, and I can prove it, and did prove it.")
App. 570, 575 (1882) ("The poor fellow is
44. Clifford v. Cochrane, 10 Ill.
crazy" and ".

.

. his appointment could be regarded in no other light than a pub-

lic calamity.")
App. 496 (1886).
45. Bihler v. Gockley, 18 Ill.
If the words are capable of the meaning ascribed to them, then it must
be left to the jury to say upon all proof of all the facts, whether such is
the true meaning or the sense in which they were understood by those
who heard them and knew the circumstances stated in the inducement.

Id. at 500.

Id.

46. The words are not prima facie defamatory, but being in our opinion
reasonably susceptible of the meaning attached to them, it follows that it
should be left to the jury to determine whether under all the circumstances, the bystanders understood them in such sense.

47. 42 Ill. App. 443 (1891) (married woman accused of "running off with a
man"t).
48. 52 Ill. 236 (1869). Supra note 32.
49. 42 Ill. App. at 448-49.
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they understood the words.50
Finally, in 1899 the appellate court again applied the reasonable construction rule to a libel case by specifying that under the
"common acceptation" doctrine the entire article in
question had
to be read as a whole and the language given its ordinarily accepted meaning.81 In the libel case of Pfitzinger v. Dubs,52 a federal
court sitting in Illinois, summed up with remarkable clarity what
seemed clearly the position of nineteenth century Illinois courts:
It is only where the words are incapable of a construction injurious to the plaintiff's character that the court is justified in taking
the case from the jury (citations omitted). The question of the
meanings of the words is one of fact for the jury unless the court
can see at a glance that they are incapable of a construction injurious to the plaintiff's character, and the court should understand
the words in the same manner that other persons reading the
whole article would naturally understand them. That is to say,
they are to be taken in their usual acceptation and meaning. 8
The conclusion to be drawn from a review of the primary case
precedent of the nineteenth century is that the Illinois Supreme
Court rejected the doctrine of the innocent construction rule and
instead clearly espoused the reasonable construction rule under the
rubric of the common acceptation rule. The Illinois Appellate
Court, with the possible exception of dubious dictum in Young v.
Richardson," also unequivocally and faithfully applied the common acceptation rule not merely to determine whether words were
slanderous on their face, but also to determine whether the slander
was actionable per se or per quod.
It is also clear that the Illinois Appellate Court extended the
principle of the common acceptation rule from slander cases to
libel cases. In light of this early development, the enigma of current Illinois defamation law is how Illinois courts came to cite the
innocent construction rule as though it were an unquestioned and
unquestionable pillar of Illinois defamation law, when, in fact, it is
an illegitimate doctrine-come-lately that flouts never overruled
50. Tottleben v. Blanship, 58 Ill. App. 47, 50 (1894) (plaintiff accused of killing defendant's heifer and trespassing on defendant's land).
51. Prussing v. Jackson, 85 II. App. 324, 332 (1899), rev. on other grounds,
208 11. 85, 69 N.E.2d 771 (1904) (plaintiff accused of conspiracy to bribe city
council members). Accord, Ranson v. McCurley, 140 I1. 626 (1892).
52. 64 F. 696 (7th Cir. 1894).
53. Id. at 697-98.

54. 4 Ill. App. 364 (1879). Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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ninetheenth century precedent which had explicitly rejected the
innocent construction rule and instead adopted a common acceptation rule.
Twentieth Century Precedent:Before John v. Tribune Co.
In the first fifty years of the twentieth century the only case
that seems to offer some semblance of support for an innocent construction rule is Fulrath v. Wolfe." The plaintiff alleged in this
1928 libel action that defendant had written a letter, claiming that
as a result of an investigation the defendant was discontinuing his
business relationship with the plaintiff. The plaintiff, having conceded that the letter in itself was not per se libel, attempted to
prove per se libel by offering evidence of slanderous words uttered
by defendant to the effect that plaintiff was a "gypper." The court
held that the slanderous words could not be read into the letter so
as to make the letter libelous when in fact it was nonlibelous. Libel, the court said, must be determined by the very written words
themselves rather than by the use of extrinsic evidence to prove
the libelous innuendo of the written words. In the course of its decision the court noted with semantic parsimony: "The words of an
alleged libel where susceptible of it, will receive an innocent construction by interpretation. Young v. Richardson (citation omitted) and Isabella Harkness v. Chicago Daily News Co. (citation
omitted)."'
But the Fulrath case is scant authority for the innocent construction rule. First of all, the case only held that to determine
libel, then the same as libel per se, one had to strip the words of all
innuendoes and look at the meaning of the words themselves. This
requirement, found in later Illinois cases, 7 whether justifiable or
not, is in any case different analytically from the innocent construction rule which holds that, even when stripped of all innuendo, allegedly libelous words must be construed innocently if
those words themselves have any innocent meaning.
Secondly, the precedent on which Fulrath relies is insufficient.
The Young v. Richardsons decision is weak support; and Hark55. 250 Il. App. 130 (1928).

56. Id. at 135 (1928).

57. Adreani v. Hansen, 80 I1. App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1980). Accord,

Moricoli v. Schwartz, 46 Il.App. 3d 481, 361 N.E.2d 74 (1977) and Zeinfeld v.
Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 Ill.
2d 345, 243 N.E.2d 217 (1968).
58. 4 111. App. 364 (1879). Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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ness v. Chicago Daily News Co.,'9 fares no better. In fact the
Harkness case used the reasonable construction rule to explain
why it affirmed a demurrer to a libel complaint.10 By citing Harkness, a reasonable construction case, to support the innocent construction rule, the court in Fulrath was performing the unorthodox
act of citing contrary doctrine to support its view. Aside from its
inherent weakness and ignorance of contrary authority, the
Fulrath decision almost imperceptibly interpolated a rigorous version of the innocent construction rule. Whereas the Young case required that the words be "fairly susceptible" of an innocent construction before the innocent construction rule would be used, the
Fulrath court only required that the words be "susceptible" of an
innocent construction.'
Not only did the court in the Fulrathdecision ignore contrary
nineteenth century decisions but it also ignored two early twentieth century decisions by the Illinois Supreme Court which had
once again reaffirmed the continuing vitality of the common acceptation or reasonable construction rule. In the first case of Ball v.
Evening American Publishing Co.,6 the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the right of a jury to award a libel verdict to the plaintiff
where the meaning of the words was ambiguous or equivocal. The
court stated in that case:
It is elementary that an alleged libelous publication must be interpreted in the sense in which readers would understand it, and
in this state it has been held in slander suits that the testimony of
the hearers as to the sense in which they understood the words
spoken is admissible (citation omitted). 8
The Illinois Supreme Court deliberately reaffirmed the common acceptation rule of Nelson v. Borchenius,"I a slander case, and
59. 102 Il1. App. 162 (1902).
60. In order to ascertain its meaning the whole of the libel should be
considered. Each phrase must be construed in the light of the entire publication. The words are to be taken in their natural and obvious meaning.
The test is, what would men of ordinary understanding infer from the
words of the libel? Nelson v. Borchenius (citation omitted).
Id. at 165.
61. Compare Young v. Richardson, 4 Ill. App. 364, 374 (1879) ("fairly susceptible") with Harkness v. Chicago Daily News Co., 250 I1. App. 130, 135
(1928)
("susceptible").
62. 142 111. App. 656 (1908), rev'd, 237 Ill. 592, 86 N.E. 1097 (1909).
63. 237 11. at 600, 86 N.E. 2d at 1100.
64. 52 11. 236 (1869). Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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applied its reasonable construction underpinning to libel cases as
well. The second contemporary precedent overlooked by the
Fulrath court was People v. Spielman" where even in a criminal
libel case, the Illinois Supreme Court again held: "The words of an
alleged libelous article must be taken in the sense which persons of
common and reasonable understanding would ascribe to them, and
all the words used in this article must be considered (citation omitted)."" If the reasonable construction methodology of the Illinois
common acceptation rule, which is more favorable to plaintiff's
cause than the innocent construction rule, was thus sanctioned
even in a criminal libel case where the consequences are harsher
for a defendant than in the usual civil libel case, the logic of the
common acceptation rule in civil libel cases should have been all
the more obvious to the Fulrath court.
Likewise at the appellate level, a number of twentieth century
Illinois Appellate Court decisions prior to Fulrath had invoked the
reasonable construction analysis of the common acceptation rule.
In 1904 the appellate court in affirming a verdict for plaintiff in a
slander per se case held: "Words are to be construed according to
their common acceptation, in the sense in which hearers of com's7
mon and reasonable understanding would ascribe to them." In
1906 a demurrer for defendant in a slander per se case was reversed because the court deemed it unnecessary that the words
spoken should of themselves make out a technical charge of crime
in order to be per se slander, if the court was able to determine
"that the language used may reasonably bear the construction put
upon it in the declaration in light of all the facts and circumstances averred."" In 1912 an intermediate tribunal in Illinois concluded that if words alleged to be libelous are incapable of a
libelous meaning the defendant should prevail as a matter of law;
if there is only one meaning and that meaning is libelous, plaintiff
should prevail as a matter of law; and if the words are ambiguous
or have a double meaning, one of which is libelous, the case should
65. 236 Ill. App. 637 (1925), aff'd, 318 111. 482, 149 N.E. 466 (1925).
at 488, 149 N.E. at 468.
66. 318 Ill.
67. Herhold v. White, 114 IM. App. 186 (1904) ("He is and has been behind

bars.").

App. 48, 53 (1906) (plaintiff accused of having
68. Skaer v. Schwartz, 127 Ill.

"shook off" apples from another's tree and "picked up" the apples). "It is not
necessary that the language used should have been meant to charge appellant
with stealing the apples alone and unassisted." Id. at 53.
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go to the jury.' 9 In a 1912 libel case the court again summarized
the law: "In interpreting the language of an article to determine
whether or not it is libelous, no different construction should be
placed upon it than men of ordinary affairs would give it. ' ' 70 In the
year 1914 alone three libel decisions of the appellate court were
grounded on the premise that the words should be given their obvious meaning and that even in a libel case an article must be read
as a whole, together with its headlines, and given its natural, obvious, and reasonably understood meanning.7 ' The same principle
was again discussed in a 1915 libel case of the appellate court.7 ' All
of these appellate court cases, therefore, were decided before the
1928 Fulrathdecision but were not discussed by that court. If precedent has any meaning, the multiplicitous contrary decisions of
the Illinois Supreme Court and Illinois Appellate Court nullify any
semblance of a claim that Fulrath may have in accounting for the
current innocent construction rule in Illinois.
After the Fulrathdecision, the Illinois courts were confronted
with the onrush of a greater number of libel cases. Several appellate cases at this time seemed to confuse the determination of
whether words were libelous on their face with the determination
of whether the libel fell within one of the traditional slander per se
categories.7 8 These decisions appeared sub silentio to modify the
older common law that all libel was per se by requiring, in effect,
that in order to be actionable per se a libel would have to fit one of
the slander per se categories. But even these cases, which apparently tried implicitly to limit the libel per se cases to those that
would be slander per se if spoken, did not abandon the reasonable
construction rule established by earlier cases. Rather, they all
adopt the view that the alleged libel is to be given a reasonable
69. Beeson v. Gossard, 167 Ill. App. 561 (1912) (plaintiff woman accused of
posing "as a scantily clad model at a medical convention").
70. Hunner v. Evening American Publishing Co., 175 Ill. App. 416, 419 (1912)
(a verdict for plaintiff was affirmed where defendant newspaper reported plaintiff
was divorced by his wife and that another woman was named in the divorce bill
because the report could reasonably impute a criminal charge of adultery).
71. Marshall v. Chicago Herald Co., 185 Ill. App. 224 (1914) (abstract); Sullivan v. Ill. Publishing & Printing Co., 186 Ill. App. 268 (1914), and Mercy v. Talbot, 189 Ill. App. 1 (1914).
72. Willfred Coal Co. v. Sapp, 93 Ill. App. 400, 412 (1915).
73. See Cavanaugh v. Elliott, 270 Ill. App. 21 (1933); Kulesza v. Chicago
Daily News, 311 Ill. App. 117, 35 N.E.2d 517 (1941); Hotz v. Alton Telegraph

Printing Co., 324 Ill. App. 1, 57 N.E.2d 137 (1944); and Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, 327 Ill. App. 339, 93 N.E.2d 512 (1946).
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interpretation and that the function of the judge is only to determine whether the allegedly libelous words are reasonably or fairly
capable of the libelous interpretation. In fact, in one of the cases,
the court countered defendant's innocent construction argument
with a "reasonable interpretation" analysis that gave the alleged
libel "a common and generally accepted meaning. ' "
The federal court, in several diversity jurisdiction cases applying Illinois law, very clearly understood Illinois to be following a
reasonable construction rule even in cases where the court seemed
to be distinguishing what was libelous on its face from what was
actionable libel per se. In the case of Spanel v. Pegler,7 8 the federal
court of appeals reversed a judgment for defendant in a libel case
with the following admonition:
It is not for us to say whether from our interpretations of words
plaintiff is characterized as a Communist or not because it would
usurp the jury function. It is sufficient that we recognize the article is capable of two meanings, one innocent and one not.70
In Christopher v. American News Co., 77 the federal court of
appeals reversed the dismissal of a libel complaint filed by a candidate for the office of mayor in Gary, Indiana, on the ground that
the libel implied he was a Nazi or pro-Nazi. If there was ever a
doubt, the court summarized the State of Illinois law very clearly:
In resolving these questions, we are mindful of the rule that the
defamatory effect of the article is to be ascertained not from the
viewpoint of a critic or language expert, but rather from that of a
reader of reasonable intelligence who takes ordinary interest in
the articles of a periodical but does not commonly subject them
to careful scrutiny and analysis. Creitz v. Bennet, 273 Ill. App. 88,
96, 350 IM.32, 182 N.E.2d 736. To state a case, the complaint
need not disclose that the article was absolutely incapable of innocent meaning. It is sufficient to create a question for the jury if
the defamatory meaning ascribed to the article in the innuendoes
may also be ascribed to it by the ordinary reader. Spanel v.
7
Pegler, supra. 8
74. Hotz v. Alton Telegraph Printing Co., 324 Ill. App. at 5, 57 N.E.2d at 139.
75. 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947), citing, Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co.,
288 M11.
405, 413, 123 N.E. 587, 590 (1919) ("Where the words are ambiguous or
equivocal in meaning, the question of the meaning to be ascribed to them is for
the jury.").
76. 160 F.2d at 623.
77. 171 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1948).
78. Id. at 278. Accord, Eatill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir.
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John v. Tribune Co.: A Wrong Turn
The cornerstone precedent of the innocent construction rule in

Illinois has been John v. Tribune Co. 7 Eve Spiro John sued the

Tribune Company in libel for reporting the results of a police raid
on a southside Chicago building in which the plaintiff rented an
apartment. The police arrested the owner of the apartment building and several women in the owner's apartment for prostitution.
The newspaper articles reported that Dorothy Clark, also known as
"Dolores Reising, 57, alias Eve Spiro and Eve John", who had been
arrested for "being keeper of a disorderly house and selling liquor
without a license" had at one time been "a girl friend of Tony Accardo, Capone gangster." 80 The plaintiff, a 27-year old practicing
psychologist whose current name was Eve John and whose maiden
name had been Eve Spiro, lived in the apartment below the one
raided but was in no way involved in any of the alleged immoral
and illegal activities carried on by the landlady. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and reinstated with affirmance the judgment of the circuit court in favor
of the Tribune Company. The narrow holding was that the article,
as a matter of law, could not be "of and concerning" the plaintiff
because the alias names necessarily removed plaintiff as the "target" of the publication and because the dictionary definition of
"alias" presupposes that the true name is that which precedes
the
alias.8 1
But rather than simply resting on this failure to establish
common law colloquium as a matter of law, the Illinois Supreme
Court, in the midst of its discussion relating to the failure to state
any reasonable colloquium by which the words could be referred to
plaintiff, rather abruptly added:
We further believe the language in defendant's articles is not
libelous of plaintiff when the innocent construction rule is consulted. That rule holds that the article is to be read as a whole
and the words given their natural and obvious meaning, and requires that words allegedly libelous that are capable of being read
innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law. Although this court has not heretofore expressed this
rule, it has been adopted and applied by our Appellate Courts
1951).
79. 24 11. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).
80. Id. at 439-40, 181 N.E.2d at 106.

81. Id. at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 107-08.
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and by Federal Courts sitting in Illinois (fifteen citations omitted). Since both of the publications here are capable of being construed as referring only to Dorothy Clark-Dolores Reising as the
keeper of the disorderly house, they are innocent publications as
to the plaintiff.5 '
The Illinois Supreme Court candidly announced in John that
it had never previously adopted the innocent construction rule.
But what it failed to mention were the prior cases in which it had
rejected the rule. Likewise, the court failed to mention the earlier
Illinois appellate decisions rejecting the rule or the earlier decisions of federal courts sitting in Illinois in which the rule had also
been rejected. The posture of the precedent was not one in which
the issue had been left open but rather one in which the Illinois
Supreme Court and almost every one of the decisions of the Illinois
Appellate Court had either expressly rejected the innocent construction rule or simply applied a reasonable construction rule
without mentioning any innocent construction rule. A possible explanation for this lapse is found in the briefs filed by each of the
parties before the Illinois Supreme Court. The brief for the plaintiff cited no cases at all relating to the innocent construction rule
so that the court was arguably not adequately apprised of the
wealth of precedent supporting a reasonable construction rule. The
theory of plaintiff's brief was that there was no need to cite precedent in opposition to the innocent construction rule because the
innocent construction rule was not an issue in the case.
For the plaintiff it was self-evident that words accusing the
plaintiff of being a gangster's moll and the keeper of a disorderly
house were so clearly libel per se on their face that not even any
extrinsic facts or innuendo were necessary to show their defamatory character. The only pertinent issue seen by the plaintiff was
whether a colloquium was made out; that is, whether a person
could reasonably relate the obvious defamation to the plaintiff so
that the issue should be left to the trier of fact. As plaintiff's brief
put it: "The point involved is not a question of libel but of identity. '84 Whatever view one takes of the John case, it does seem
obvious that, if the issue of identity or colloquium is put aside, the
words themselves are libelous on their face so that they are libel
82. Id. at 442-43, 181 N.E.2d at 108.

83. Plaintiff's Brief at 10.
84. Id.
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per se under the older view that all libel is actionable per se.8" But
even if one takes the newer view, which became current about the
time of the John case, that libel per se is practically restricted to
what would be slander per se, then the words themselves in John
would still be libel per se because they impute the commission of a
criminal offense which would have been slander per se if spoken
and possibly because they prejudiced the plaintiff in her profession
of practicing psychologist."
The first major difficulty with the John case is the difficulty
noted by the plaintiff in her Illinois Supreme Court brief: none of
the cases cited by the Tribune Company and used by the Illinois
Supreme Court concerns the issue of colloquium.07 All fifteen of
the precedents cited by the John court in support of the innocent
construction rule were taken directly from the brief of the defendant Tribune Company." The problem is that all of these cases
concern the nature of the allegedly defamatory language and
whether such language is capable of an innocent meaning; none
considers the separate issue of whether, even if the words can or
should be construed innocently or not, they reasonably refer to the
plaintiff.
The confusion of these two issues is not supported by standard common law development in the defamation field."9 To say
85. Supra note 42.
86. For this newer view, practically restricting libel per se to what would be
slander per se without completely giving up the ghost of the older view that what
is libelous on its face might in an appropriate case also be libel per se even if it
would not be slander per se, see Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp., 59 IMI.App.
2d 337, 207 N.E.2d 482 (1965); Reed v. Albanese, 78 I. App. 2d 53, 223 N.E.2d
419 (1966); Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Co., 82 II. App. 2d 76,
227 N.E.2d 164 (1967), affd, 40 IMI.2d 257, 239 N.E.2d 837 (1968); Bontkowski v.
Chicago Sun-Times, 115 Ill. App. 2d 229, 252 N.E.2d 689 (1969); Adreani v. Hansen, 80 IM.App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1980); and Richardson v. Dunbar, - Ill.
App. 3d 419 N.E.2d 1205 (Ill. App. 1981). But cf. Snead v. Forbes, 2 m. App.
3d 22, 275 N.E.2d 746 (1971).
87. "The 'plethora' of cases cited by defendant to show that 'words capable
of an innocent construction must be so construed as a matter of law' (Deft. 15),
smoke screens defendant's attack on the appellate court's first opinion and
obscures the real issues involved. The 'innocent construction' rule has nothing
whatever to do with the case at bar." Plaintiff's Brief at 10.
88. Compare fifteen cases cited in Defendant's Brief at 15-16 with fifteen
cases cited in John v. Tribune Co., 24 IMI. 2d at 442-43, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
89. A publication may be clearly defamatory as to somebody and yet on its
face make no reference to the plaintiff. In such a case the plaintiff must sustain
the burden of pleading and proof by way of colloquium that the defamatory
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that a case should be dismissed as a matter of law because no reasonable jury could relate a defamatory reference to the plaintiff is
one thing; to dismiss a case because the words are capable of an
innocent meaning even though they refer to a clearly identifiable
plaintiff is clearly something else. Since the John case can be restricted to the narrow holding that the colloquium in a defamation
case may be so deficient that the issue will be decided for defendant as a matter of law, all of the language in John relating to the
innocent construction rule should be dismissed as obiter dictum."
In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court itself in Troman v. Wood" distinguished the John case on the ground that the colloquium issue
in Troman presented a reasonable question of fact for the jury
whether or not the plaintiff in that case was referred to by the
allegedly libelous article, whereas the connection in the John case
between the defamation and the plaintiff was too attentuated to be
made by any reasonable jury. The only function of the trial judge
is to determine whether the article is capable of referring to the
plaintiff and if it is, the jury considers whether, in fact, a colloquium is made out. Why then cannot the same functional test be
used to determine the meaning of the words? Especially since the
John court interwove the colloquium issue and the innocent construction issue, how can the Illinois Supreme Court logically continue to use inconsistent judge/jury roles concerning issues so
closely related?
meaning attached to him. W. PRossfs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 at
749 (4th ed. 1971). See also Hambric v. Field Enterprises, 46 Ill. App. 2d 355, 196

N.E.2d 489 (1964). "The question of whether words are libelous per se is separate
and distinct from the question of whether they refer to plaintiff." 46 Ill. App. 2d
at 359, 196 N.E.2d at 492.

90. "I consider the 'innocent construction rule' from John v. Tribune Co., 24
I. 2d 437, 442 (which I read as obiter dictum) has no place here." Valentine v.

North American Co. for Life and Health Ins., 60 Ill. 2d 168, 172, 328 N.E.2d 265,
268 (1974) (Ward, J., dissenting and joined by Underwood, C.J., and Schaefer, J.).
91. 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1976) (Schaefer, J.).
Unlike John v. Tribune Co., (1962), 24 IMI. 2d 437, no question arises here
as to the identity of the person referred to by the article. Whether the
article was in fact understood by readers to refer to the plaintiff might
ultimately be a question for the jury, should there be a controversy on

that matter. But the preliminary determination whether the article is

capable of being so understood is a question of law which must, upon the
motion to dismiss in this case, be resolved in favor of the plaintiff (citation omitted).
Id. at 189, 340 N.E.2d at 294. Accord, Beresky v. Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848,
851, 381 N.E.2d 979, 981 (1978).
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It seems clear that the Illinois Supreme Court has left the way
open to restrict at a future time the holding in the John case to
the colloquium issue alone, should it ever choose to repudiate what
passes for the innocent construction rule. Although the overwhelming number of Illinois cases treat the innocent construction rule in
terms of the words used and not the target of those words, the
Illinois Appellate Court in Belmonte v. Rubin9 and Bravo Realty,
Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem"8 has recently assumed that
the point of the murky John decision was to extend the innocent
construction rule to the issue of colloquium as well as to the issue
of the defamatory meaning of the words used. The Troman Illinois
Supreme Court approach apparently limits the innocent construction rule to the meaning of the words used and does not extend it
to the issue of the colloquium where the normal judge/jury demarcation exists: could reasonable persons find that a reference was
made to the plaintiff even though other reasonable persons, including the judge, might not find such a reference?" The recent approach of the Illinois Appellate Court in Belmonte and Bravo Realty, neither of which mentions the Troman case but both of which
cite the John case, adopts the conflicting approach of extending
the innocent construction rule to the colloquium issue so that a
jury would never hear a defamation case where the defamatory
words reasonably relate to the plaintiff, but could also, by judicial
92. The principle of innocent construction is applied in determining not
only whether the words in question can be interpreted in a way which is
not libelous or defamatory but also in a way which does not relate them

to the plaintiff. Thus, in John, the court held that because the publication there was capable of being construed as referring to a person other
than the plaintiff, it was an innocent publication as to the plaintiff.
Belmonte v. Rubin, 68 I. App. 3d 700, 701, 386 N.E.2d 904 (1979). See also Lev-

inson v. Time, Inc.,
ll. App. 3d , 411 N.E.2d 1118 (1980).
93. 84 M11.
App. 3d 862, 406 N.E.2d 61 (1980). "Since under the innocent con-

struction rule, the comments are capable of being construed as referring to parties
other than plaintiff, we consider the program an innocent publication with regard

to plaintiff." Id. at 867, 406 N.E.2d at 64. But under Troman the question is the
reverse: are the comments capable of referring to plaintiff and if so, a reasonable

jury should determine whether in fact they refer to plaintiff or others. The

Troman approach is the standard common law approach to deciding whether a
jury should hear a colloquium issue. "The test is: Would a person to whom the
statement was published reasonably think it referred to the plaintiff?. It is not
necessary to show that persons did understand the statement as referring to the
plaintiff but only that it was capable of being so understood by reasonable per-

sons." J. TYAS, LAW OF TORTS 131 (The M & E Handbook Series, 1968).
94. 62 IMI. 2d 184, 340 N.E. 2d 292 (1976).
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construction, reasonably or hypothetically not relate to the plain-

tiff but to some other person. The Belmonte and Bravo Realty
cases are examples of an innocent construction rule run rampant
after its seemingly innocuous incubation in the obiter dictum of

the John decision. Either the John language commingling the innocent construction issue with the colloquium issue is obiter dictum, as it clearly seems to be, or Illinois is unique in the whole
common law world for its spectacular feat of taking two separate

issues and transmogrifying them into a peculiar hybrid never seen
before by legal scholars. The irony is that a recent appellate decision has had to remind the bar that the innocent construction rule
is not limited to colloquium questions involving the identity of the
plaintiff but extends as well to the original use of that concept in
relation to the meaning of the words themselves."
Even if the innocent construction paragraph in the John case
were not obiter dictum, the fifteen Illinois appellate and federal

cases taken from defendant's brief in that case and cited by the
court" are all, save one," libel cases. All the libel cases, save one,"
95. Levinson v. Time, Inc.,

-

Mll. App. 3d

-,

411 N.E.2d 1118, 1122-23

(1980).
96. The fifteen cases cited by the John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442-43,
181 N.E.2d 105, 108 (1962) in support of the innocent construction rule are the
following: LaGrange Press v. Citizen Publishing Co., 252 IMI. App. 482, (1929);
Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 M. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952); Tiernan v.
East Shore Newspapers Inc., 1 IlL App. 2d 150, 116 N.E.2d 896 (1953); Brewer v.
Hearst Publishing Co., 185 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1951); Epton v. Vail, 2 Ill. App. 2d
287, 119 N.E.2d 410 (1954) (abstract); Fulrath v. Wolfe, 250 IMI. App. 130 (1928);
Davis v. Ferguson, 246 M. App. 318 (1927); Dilling v. Illinois Publishing and
Printing Co., 340 M. App. 303, 91 N.E.2d 635 (1950); Parmelee v. Hearst Publishing Co., 341 Ill. App. 339, 93 N.E.2d 512 (1950); Gogerty v. Covins, 5 IM.App. 2d
74, 124 N.E.2d 602 (1955); Piacenti v. Williams Press, Inc., 347 IlI. App. 440, 107
N.E.2d 45 (1952) (abstract); Sullivan v. Illinois Publishing Co., 186 IMI.App. 268
(1914) (abstract); Crosby v. Time, Inc., 254 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1958); Schy v.
Hearst Publishing Co., 205 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1953); and Creitz v. Bennett, 273 IMl.
App. 88 (1933).
97. The only slander case is Creitz v. Bennet, 273 IlM. App. 88 (1933), in
which the court apparently confused the question of whether words could be interpreted on their face as slanderous with the separate question of whether they
were per se and invoked in part the innocent construction rule to conclude:
The above quoted words are in and of themselves not slanderous unless a
meaning may be ascribed to the words which would be susceptible of a
meaning to the injury of the plaintiff in the business or work in which he
was engaged.
Id. at 97.
98. In Crosby v. Time, Inc., 254 F.2d 927, 929-30 (7th Cir. 1958) the court
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are cases in which the court is apparently trying to decide whether
the libel is actionable per se or simply per quod so that a further
requirement of special damages would have to be proven. The
cases cited simply do not stand for the broader proposition that
allegedly libelous words, or even defamatory words, that are capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law. Even the cases cited by the John court,
at least ten of them, expressly leave open the opportunity for a
plaintiff who cannot make out a libel per se case under the innocent construction rule to still seek recovery for libel per quod if
special damages can be proven." It is clear, therefore, that even
under the most hospitable analysis of the innocent construction
rule, that so-called rule was never intended to be the test of
whether language was initially defamatory on its face, but was at
best simply intended to be the test of the kind of defamation involved, that is, defamation per se or defamation per quod.
But even regarding this limited issue of using the innocent
construction rule to separate defamation per se from defamation
per quod, the authorities cited by the John case simply do not provide unequivocal precedential support for the innocent construction rule in Illinois. Sullivan v. Illinois Publishing Co.100 a 1914
abstract Illinois appellate decision, the earliest of the cases cited
by John, actually is a reasonable construction case. In the abstract
opinion the Sullivan court concluded in pertinent part:
We do not think the trial court erred in holding that the language
could not be reasonably understood as construed by these innuendoes. Each part of the article must be construed in connection
with all the rest of it and the words taken in the sense which the
readers of common and reasonable understanding would ascribe
seems totally preoccupied in using the "so-called innocent construction rule" to
determine whether the words are even libelous without reaching the question,
even implicitly, whether the libel might be actionable per se or only per quod.
99. See, e.g., Brewer v. Hearst Publishing Co., 185 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir.
1950); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 306, 106 N.E.2d 742, 748
(1952); Tiernan v. East Shore Newspapers, 1 II. App. 2d 150, 156, 116 N.E.2d
896, 899 (1952); Davis v. Ferguson, 246 IM.App. 318, 333 (1927); Dilling v. Illinois
Publishing and Printing Co., 340 Ill. App. 303, 305, 91 N.E.2d 635, 636 (1950);

Parmelee v. Hearst Publishing Co., 341 Ill. App. 339, 347, 93 N.E.2d 512, 515
(1950); Gogerty v. Covins, 5 Ill. App. 2d 74, 81, 124 N.E.2d 602, 606 (1955);
Piacenti v. Williams Press, Inc., 347 IM. App. 440, 107 N.E.2d 45 (1952) (abstract
at 6); Creitz v. Bennett, 273 Ill. App. 88, 96 (1933); and Schy v. Hearst Publishing
Co., 205 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1953).

100. 186 Ill. App. 268 (1914) (abstract).
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to them. People v. Fuller, 238 Ill. 116.101
Likewise, in the 1927 case of Davis v. Ferguson,0 also cited by
John, the appellate court actually used a reasonable construction
rule, and not an innocent construction rule, to explain why there
was no defamation action: "The established rule in this state is
that the words in an action of libel must be taken in the sense in
which the readers of common and reasonable understanding would
ascribe to them - that is, in their ordinary or common acceptation." 1 " These pre-Fulrathcases are not evidence of any innocent
construction rule but rather of a reasonable construction rule that
just happens to arrive at the same result as an innocent construction rule. Again, the cited case of Gogerty v. Covins1 " does not
mention an innocent construction rule but uses the reasonable construction rule: "We cannot agree that an ordinary reasonable
reader would understand the language of the advertisement, editorial, and handbill taken together or separately to charge plaintiff
with embezzling money of the City of Danville." 105 Finally, the innocent construction rule is not used in the federal case of Schy v.
Hearst Publishing Co.,'" but rather, the reasonable construction
given by an average person: "The words of the publication must be
taken in their usual and common acceptance. 10 7 Four of the cases
cited by John, therefore, do not use an innocent construction rule
or even mention the rule by name but instead use the prior Illinois
reasonable construction rule.
The two cited cases of LaGrange Press v. Citizens Publishing
Co.,' 0 8 and Brewer v. Hearst PublishingCo.,10 are likewise not sufficient support for an innocent construction rule even though the
innocent construction rule is mentioned. In LaGrange the court
carefully stated:
In determining whether or not the published article is libelous
per se we must view it stripped of all innuendo, colloquium or
101. Id. at 6 (abstract opinion).
102. 246 Ill. App. 318 (1927).

103. Id. at 327.
104. 5 111. App. 2d 74, 124 N.E.2d 602 (1955).
105. Id. at 81.

106. 205 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1953).

107. Id. at 752.
108. 252 IMI.App. 482 (1929).
109. 185 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1951). Brewer was later interpreted as a reasonable construction case. See Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir.
1951).
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extrinsic or explanatory circumstances, and if the words are unambiguous and incapable of an innocent meaning they may be
declared libelous as a matter of law (citations omitted). In determining this, the words must be taken in the sense which readers
of common and reasonable understanding would ascribe to them,
that is, in their ordinary and common acceptance.'"
In Brewer the court tracked LaGrange faithfully by applying a
"common acceptation" rule but noting that "if the words are unambiguous and incapable of an innocent meaning, they may be
declared libelous as a matter of law.""' Both of these cases are
perfectly consistent with a reasonable construction rule, even
though they mention the innocent construction rule. What the
cases could simply stand for is the obvious and familiar proposition that if words are incapable of an innocent meaning, then,
under a normal reasonable construction rule, the jury should not
hear the case because it would be unreasonable for the jury to find
for the defendant in such a case. The beginning of confusion in the
Illinois cases is seen in the attempt of LaGrange Press and Brewer
to mention the rejected innocent construction rule as an adden12
dum to the earlier normal common acceptation rule.1
Five of the decisions cited by John seem to have become hopelessly confused in their attempts to reconcile the reasonable construction rule with the Fulrath v. Wolfe" 8 innocent construction
case cited by John and critically evaluated earlier in this article. In
the first such case of Creitz v. Bennett"' the court attempted the
"mission impossible" task of combining both approaches:
However, in the discussion of the words alleged to have been used
by the defendants, it is well to have in mind that the alleged slanderous words, when susceptible of it, will receive an innocent construction by interpretation, and the alleged slanderous words cannot be, by innuendo, extended beyond a reasonable construction,
and in determining the meaning of the spoken words, they are to
110. 252 II. App. at 485.
111. 185 F.2d at 850.
112. The LaGrange reference in 252 Ill. App. at 486 to Young v. Richardson,
4 111. App. 364 (1879), Fulrath v. Wolfe, 250 III. App. 130 (1928) and Harkness v.
Chicago Daily News Co., 102 III. App. 130 (1902) are the only shreds of prior
support in Illinois law for an innocent construction rule. These cases have been
distinguished and criticized supra notes 38, 55, and in the accompanying text.
113. 250 111. App. 130 (1928). Supra note 55 and accompanying text.
114. 273 Ill. App. 88 (1933). Creitz was later interpreted as a reasonable construction case. See Christopher v. American News Co., 171 F.2d 275, 278 (7th Cir.
1948).
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be taken in the sense which persons of common and reasonable
understanding would ascribe to the words in their ordinary and
common acceptation. LaGrangePress v. Citizens Publishing Co.,
252 Ill. App. 482; Fuirathv. Wolfe, 250 Ill. App. 130.' "
The confusion that was to bedevil future Illinois law became
rooted securely in the 1933 Creitz case. The logical fallacy of
Creitz is the apparent view that a reasonable construction of words
in their ordinary and common acceptation must mean that the innocent interpretation applies if the words are at all susceptible of
such an interpretation. But such an innocent construction in the
real world may not at all be reasonable in a given social context.
This attempt to use both rules at the same time is found also in
other cases cited by the John case, Dilling v. Illinois Publishing
Co.," Parmelee v. Hearst Publishing Co., 117 Tiernan v. East
Shore Newspapers, Inc.," s and Epton v. Vail.'1 '
By elimination, therefore, the only cases lending any credible
support to an innocent construction rule and cited by John are
Fulrathv. Wolfe,'2 Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co.,12' the abstract case
of Piacenti v. Williams Press, Inc.,"' and the federal case of
Crosby v. Time, Inc..'" And of these, the Piacenticase would only
apply the rule if the language were "reasonably susceptible" and
not merely capable of an innocent meaning. 12 4 Moreover, Piacenti
and Eick imply that had special damages been adequately alleged
the courts there might have allowed recovery per quod despite the
innocent construction rule."'5 Although not discussed expressly in
the case, Piacenti involved the potential privilege of fair comment
relating to remarks made about an incumbent during a political
campaign and could easily be distinguished on that basis. What is
115. Id. at 96. Compare Proesel v. Myers Publishing Co., 241 11. App. 2d 501,
509-510, 165 N.E.2d 352, 356-57 (1960) where the appellate court inexplicably
states that ambiguous words with innocent and defamatory double meanings are

for the jury but also states that the words will be construed innocently where
"reasonably susceptible" of such interpretation.
116.
117.
118.
119.

340 111. App. 303, 91 N.E.2d 635 (1950).
341 Ill. App. 339, 93 N.E.2d 512 (1950).
1 Ill. App. 2d 150, 116 N.E.2d 896 (1953).
2 Ill. App. 2d 287, 119 N.E.2d 410 (1954) (abstract).

121.
122.
123.
124.

347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
347 Ill. App. 440, 107 N.E.2d 45 (1952) (abstract).
254 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1958).
Abstract opinion at 6.

120. 250 II. App. 130 (1928).

125. Id. and 347 Ill. App. at 306, 106 N.E.2d at 748.
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left then is the federal case of Crosby referring to a "so-called
innocent construction rule' 1 and the discredited Fulrath v.
Wolfe 3 7 case which is the thin reed relied on by the Eick case. The
Eick case typified the almost unsolvable confusion of Illinois law
1
by also citing the LaGrange case, a common acceptation case. 2
What is apparent is that during the 1950's the appellate court became confused in trying to follow the earlier lead of LaGrange and
Creitz in their chimerical task of trying to reconcile Fulrath with
the impressive array of cases which had adopted the reasonable
construction rule.
The precedential support for the John case is, therefore, really
built of shifting sand. The cited cases of John either stand for the
opposite reasonable construction rule, confuse both rules, or rely
on the inadequate analysis of the Futrath case.
From another perspective, many of the cases cited by John
can also be explained on grounds other than the innocent construction rule. Crosby v. Time, Inc.,1 29 one of the hard core innocent
construction cases cited by John, reached the innocent construction rule as obiter dictum because the decision was actually bottomed on the ground that there was no colloquium reference to the
plaintiff and in addition there was no defamation under any theory
because the plaintiff had been accused of committing the commendable and clearly nondefamatory act of trying to remove a corrupt police chief from office. Seven of the fifteen cases cited rested
expressly on the alternate ground that, whether or not the innocent construction rule applied, the defendant could not be liable
where the defendant was exercising a conditional privilege of commenting on the actions of a public official or a public issue of the
day.'" 0 Furthermore, at least seven of the cases seem equally concerned about prohibiting the use of innuendo, or facts outside the
words themselves, in the determination of libel per se.' 81 But the
126. 254 F.2d at 929-30.
127. 250 Ill.
App. 130 (1928). Supra note 55 and accompanying text.
128. 252 Ill.
App. 482 (1929). Supra note 110 and accompanying text.
129. 254 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1958).
130. Tiernan v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 1 I1. App. 2d 150, 155-56, 116
N.E.2d 896, 898-99 (1953); Davis v. Ferguson, 246 Ill. App. 318, 332 (1927); Dilling
v. Illinois Publishing and Printing Co., 340 Il1. App. 303, 307, 91 N.E.2d 635, 637
(1950); Parmelee v. Hearst Publishing Co., 341 Ill.
App. 339, 346-47, 93 N.E.2d
512, 515 (1950); Gogerty v. Covina, 5 IM.App. 2d 74, 82-83, 124 N.E.2d 602, 605-06
(1955); Sullivan v. Illinois Publishing Co., 186 Ill. App. 268, (1914) (abstract at
24); and Brewer v. Hearst Publishing Co., 185 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 1950).
131. LaGrange Press v. Citizen Publishing Co., 252 Ill. App. 482, 485 (1929);
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decision to restrict the interpretation of the words to the words
themselves without evidence of how the words are understood
through innuendo, no matter how wise a decision is still not the
same as the innocent construction rule which requires the dismissal of a case even where there was no innuendo but the words
themselves had an innocent meaning as well as a defamatory one.
And even were one to accept the legitimacy of the innocent construction rule under the totality of Illinois precedent, the procrustean rigor of the John case lies in its assertion that if the words are
only capable of being read innocently they must be so read and the
case dismissed as a matter of law. But Illinois precedent does not
support such a stultifying version of the innocent construction rule
and in fact the cases cited by the John case itself typically refer to
the use of the innocent construction rule only when an innocent
meaning would be reasonable."a2 The removal of a question from
the jury simply because the words might reasonably have an innocent meaning still does not explain why the words would fall to
have a reasonably defamatory meaning as well and why a jury
should not be allowed to find that defamatory meaning. But at
least such a modified version of the innocent construction rule does
not invite the trial judge, as does the John decision, to strain in
finding an innocent meaning merely to dismiss the case, even
where the defamatory meaning is far more probable.
Tiernan v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 1 Ill. App. 2d 150, 157, 116 N.E.2d 896,
899 (1953); Dilling v. Illinois Publishing and Printing Co., 340 Ill. App. 303, 306,
91 N.E.2d 635, 637 (1950); Parmelee v. Hearst Publishing Co., 341 IMI.App. 339,
343, 93 N.E.2d 512, 513 (1950); Sullivan v. Illinois Publishing Co., 186 11. App.
268 (1914) (abstract at 20); Creitz v. Bennett, 273 Ill. App. 88, 96 (1933); and
Fulrath v. Wolfe, 250 Ill. App. 130, 134 (1928).
132. LaGrange Press v. Citizen Publishing Co., 252 Ill. App. 482, 485-86
(1929) ("reasonably susceptible"); Dilling v. Illinois Publishing and Printing Co.,
340 111. App. 303, 306, 91 N.E.2d 635, 637 (1950) ("reasonably susceptible"); Parmelee v. Hearst Publishing Co., 341 Ill. App. 339, 343, 93 N.E.2d 512, 513 (1950)
("reasonably given"); Piacenti v. Williams Press, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 440, 107
N.E.2d 45 (1952) (abstract at 6) ("reasonably susceptible"), Brewer v. Hearst
Publishing Co., 185 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 1951) ("reasonably susceptible"). But
cf. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 II. App. 293, 306, 106 N.E.2d 742, 748 (1952)
("if possible"); Crosby v. Time, Inc., 254 F.2d 927, 929-930 (7th Cir. 19 ) ("capable"); Epton v. Vail, 2 Ill. App. 2d 287, 119 N.E.2d 410 (1954) (abstract at 2)
("when susceptible" v. "reasonable construction"); Fulrath v. Wolfe, 250 Ill. App.
103, 135 (1928) ("where susceptible"); Tierman v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 1
Ill. App. 150, 154, 116 N.E.2d 896, 898 (1953) ("when susceptible" v. "reasonable
construction").
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CONCLUSION: THE RIGHT ROAD BACK

The John decision should be re-examined and overruled because it rests neither on solid precedent, solid reason, or solid policy grounds. The precedential basis for the decision consists of a
dubious cluster of appellate and federal cases that fly in the face of
overwhelming prior and contemporary precedent which had undeviatingly adopted the reasonable construction, or common acceptation, rule. No prior Illinois Supreme Court decision had endorsed
the innocent construction rule and, on the contrary, the Illinois Supreme Court had several times chosen the reasonable construction
rule instead. Even the blossoming of the innocent construction rule
in Illinois after the John decision is completely counter to mainstream developments across the country where the reasonable construction rule has been followed. Only several states, at best, have
a semblance of the Illinois innocent construction rule' 3 and none
of them has extended the innocent construction rule to the issue of
the colloquium. The Illinois Supreme Court in the John case was
inadequately briefed regarding the many prior Illinois cases which
had chosen the reasonable construction rule and arguably did not
have sufficient information before it to make so important a decision in the law of defamation. In any case, the John dictum on the
innocent construction rule was not essential to that decision whose
holding revolved around a separate and distinct colloquium issue.
There are compelling reasons why the Illinois Supreme Court
should avail itself of the opportunity to re-examine the John decision when the time arises. Unless the court does re-examine the
case, Illinois Appellate Courts will continue to apply the innocent
construction rule to the law of slander as well as to the law of
libel,'3 4 to the determination of defamation on its face as well as to
the entangling but subsidiary issue of the per se/per quod distinction,"' 5 and to the issues of colloquium and innuendo.'8 s
133. Supra note 25.
134. See, e.g., Creitz v. Bennett, 273 Ill.
App. 88 (1933) (slander); Conrad v.
Logan, 4 II. App. 3d 981, 283 N.E.2d 54 (1972) (slander); and Kirk v. Village of
Hillcrest, 31 Ill.
App. 3d 1063, 335 N.E.2d 535 (1975) (slander).
135. Compare, e.g., Kakuris v. Klein, Ill. App. 3d -,
410 N.E.2d 984,
986 (1980) ("In this jurisdiction, a writing is not defamatory if it may be given an
innocent construction.") where the court is deciding the preliminary question

whether the words are even defamatory with Makis v. Area Publications Corp., 77

Ill. App. 3d 452, 456-57, 395 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (1979) ("In determining whether

the challenged language falls within one or more of these recognized categories

. . .words allegedly libelous that are capable of being read innocently must be so
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The illogic of the rule is, in the first place, manifested in its
very formulation. The innocent construction rule impossibly tries
to merge the earlier reasonable construction, or common acceptation, rule with the later innovation of the innocent construction
rule. The two rules are logically clashing and conflicting, not supplemental or harmonious. To say that words must be read as a
whole and given their natural and obvious meaning, on the one
hand, but must be branded automatically nondefamatory as a matter of law, if the words are capable of being read in a nondefamatory manner, on the other hand, runs the repeated risk of becoming internally contradictory when applied to actual fact patterns.
To say that a person is "gay" in contemporary society might in the
proper context only mean that the person has a happy attitude,
rather than homosexual inclinations; but to assume that such is its
natural and obvious meaning in every social context is to play an
arid semantic game that is neither natural nor obvious. To say that
a doctor is a "quack" would even more obviously not be taken by
anyone to mean that the doctor was a duck. That simply is not its
rational meaning though it may be an innocent one. The social
context provided by the jury simply cannot be forsaken in the
name of giving words their natural and obvious meaning. The
irony is too great. One may laud the attempt of the Illinois Supreme Court in John to keep both the reasonable construction rule
and the innocent construction rule bound together in one rule. But
to attempt that is akin to breeding elephants with wings.
The innocent construction rule is in another sense too logical
read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law.") where the court is deciding
whether the defamatory words are per so or per quod. Likewise, compare Vee See
Constr. Co. v. Jensen & Halstead, Ltd., 79 M1.App. 3d 1084, 1086, 399 N.E.2d 278,
279 (1979) (innocent construction rule used to determine whether words are defamatory per se) with Altman v. Amoco Oil Co., 85 IMI.App. 3d 104, 107, 406
N.E.2d 142, 144 (1980) (innocent construction rule used to determine whether
words are even defamatory).
136. See, e.g., Archibald v. Belleville News Democrat, 54 IMI.App. 2d 38, 203
N.E.2d 281 (1964) (colloquium); Hambric v. Field Enterprises, 46 IMI.App. 2d 355,
196 N.E.2d 489 (1964) (colloquium); Belmonte v. Rubin, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 700, 386
N.E.2d 904 (1979) (colloquium); and Bravo Realty, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 84 IM.App. 3d 862, 406 N.E.2d 61 (1980) (colloquium).
Termed the rule of innocent construction, this analysis requires that the
meaning of the statement be gathered, not from isolated passages, but
from the context of the language, stripped of innuendo and read in the
best possible light. (citations omitted).
Maids v. Area Publications Corp., 77 I. App. 3d 452, 457, 395 N.E.2d 1185, 1189
(1979).
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because if it is taken literally to determine initially whether the
words are even defamatory on their face, there should never be a
jury trial in Illinois on the nature of the words. For, if the words
are reasonably capable of innocent meaning, the trial judge should
dismiss the case. The only other kind of case will be a situation in
which the words are not capable of any reasonably innocent meaning. Therefore, the trial judge should enter a judgment for the
plaintiff, at least on the meaning of the words, because no reasonable jury by definition could ever find the words to be innocent.
But there is no suggestion in the case law that Illinois has removed
the issue of defamatory meaning entirely from the consideration of
a jury in all cases. It seems, therefore, that either the rule is not
completely understood or that it is understood all too well and
trial judges will not apply the severity of its logic in all cases.
The innocent construction rule confers no palpable policy advantages that would offset its insufficient support in either logic or
precedent. In MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co.,1 87 a critical case
in which California reversed course by overruling its innocent construction line of cases and adopting instead a reasonable construction view, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court observed that the innocent construction rule offers no particular
protection to the innocent defamer but instead offers solace for the
aware defamer. A newspaper which erroneously prints innocently
that "Mrs. A. gave birth to a child last night" is protected from
libel, in the absence of per quod special damages, at least so long
as the newspaper was unaware of the extrinsic or unstated fact
that Mrs. A. had only been married a month before giving birth.388
But, under the innocent construction rule, if the same newspaper
were to print that "Mrs. A., who was married last month, gave
birth to a child last night," the newspaper is just as well protected
as in the first hypothetical because even though the wording itself
137. 52 Cal.2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959) (Traynor, J.).
The fact that an implied charge or insinuation leaves room for an innocent interpretation as well does not establish that the defamatory meaning does not appear from the language itself. The language used may give
rise to conflicting inferences as to the meaning intended, but when it is
addressed to the public at large, it is reasonable to assume that at least
some of the readers will take it in its defamatory sense. (citation
omitted).
Id. at 549, 343 P.2d at 43. New York also follows a reasonable construction rule.
James v. Gannett, 40 N.Y.2d 415, 353 N.E.2d 834, 386 N.Y.S. 2d 871 (1976).
138. 52 Cal.2d at 550, 343 P.2d at 43-44.

[1981:1811

ILLINOIS DEFAMATION LAW

should have alerted the newspaper to the risk of error, the innocent construction is that Mrs. A. was widowed or divorced before
her recent marriage and the child is that of her former husband. 3 '
Justice Traynor wrote of this nice distinction:
Such hairsplitting analysis of language has no place in the law of
defamation dealing as it does with the impact of communications
between ordinary human beings.... It protects, not the innocent defamer whose words are libelous only because of facts unknown to him, but the clever writer versed in the law of defamation who deliberately14 casts a grossly defamatory imputation in
ambiguous language.

0

The policy reason recently given for the innocent construction
rule by the Illinois Appellate Court is that it guarantees first
amendment interests of free speech and free press so that a
healthy discussion of daily affairs is encouraged and litigation is
reduced.14 1 The reduction of litigation is not a plausible policy reason in itself because a fortiori the elimination of the law of defamation would not only reduce litigation in the area but eliminate it
altogether. But it has not been seriously suggested in Illinois that
reduction of the case backlog should be purchased at the price of
totally leaving reputation and character interests unprotected. The
policy of protecting freedom of expression interests is of more substantial concern. The preferred interests swirling about the first
amendment protection of speech and press certainly have to be
given due weight. But those interests are not absolute."14 Neither
the United States Constitution nor that of the State of Illinois requires that the law of defamation be abolished, or more specifically, that the State of Illinois must as a matter of constitutional
139. Id.

140. Id. at 550-51, 343 P.2d at 44.

141. Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 78 IM.App. 3d 67, 71, 397 N.E.2d 41, 44
(1979). See also Sloan v. Hatton, 66 IMI. App. 3d 41, 42, 383 N.E.2d 259, 260 (1978)
("Free speech is not restricted to compliments.").

142. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been

thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words
- those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an

immediate breach of the peace.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). "Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation."

Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S 75, 86 (1965).
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law adopt an innocent construction rule.143 At best the interests
being discussed are not mandated by constitutional law but are
secondary interests within the penumbra of constitutional rights;
interests which nonetheless have to be balanced against other important interests, such as character, reputation, and even privacy.
The strong concern in Illinois about the protection of those
other important interests is manifested in many ways. Unlike most
common law states, Illinois, through its constitution, allows truth
as a defense in a libel case only when uttered "with good motives
and justifiable ends" and not as an absolute defense.1 44 In Troman
v. Wood" 5 the Illinois Supreme Court, unlike courts in other

states, refused to extend the actual malice test of New York Times
v. Sullivan1 4 to private defamation litigation. Instead of requiring

that the private defamation plaintiff prove that the defendant

published the statement with knowledge of its falsity or reckless
disregard of whether the statement was false or not, the Troman
court only required that such a plaintiff meet a negligence stan-

dard, the minimal standard required by the United States Su-

preme Court in Gertz v. Welch,14 7 even though it is obvious that an
actual malice standard would have struck the balance in favor of
freedom-of-expression interests to a far greater extent than a negligence standard. Nor has Illinois, unlike other states, abolished punitive damages in defamation lawsuits even though this would bolster the balance in favor of freedom-of-expression interests.1 48 In
143. See Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290 (1919) where the
United States Supreme Court itself chose a reasonable construction analysis in a
defamation action. Accord, Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188, 192 (D.D.C. 1965).
"All persons may speak, write, and publish freely, being responsible for the abuse
of that liberty. In trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense."
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
144. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4. This current state constitutional provision is identical to the earlier one, aside from a minor stylistic change. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 4
(1870).
145. 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1976). But cf. AAFCO Heating and Air
Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d
580 (1974) (actual malice); Walker v. Colorado, 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975)
(actual malice); and Commercial Programming Unlimited v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 81 Misc. 2d 678, 367 S.W.2d 986 (1976) (actual malice).
146. 376 U.S. 354 (1964).
147. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
148. For states and courts abolishing punitive damages in defamation cases,
see, e.g., Maheu v. Hughes, 384 F. Supp. 166 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Taskett v. King
Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976); and Newton v. Family
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addition, Illinois protects the individual from invasion of privacy
not only through common law tort development, but also through
a specific constitutional guarantee.1'4 One of the now recognized
branches of privacy law is the branch that provides recovery for a

plaintiff who is put in a false light before the public eye. "
Whatever the theoretical differences from defamation law, the
overlap between the false light invasion of privacy tort and the
traditional law of defamation is extensive because both are fundamentally premised on a false statement that causes harm by bring-

ing one into discredit among the members of the community."'1

Yet, the Illinois cases embracing the innocent construction rule
have not yet suggested that the same artificial logic of the innocent
construction rule should be applied to false light privacy cases so
that such a plaintiff should lose as a matter of law if the situation
can possibly be construed in an innocent light. Yet either the pol-

icy behind the innocent construction rule is valid as to both torts
or it is valid as to neither.
Finally, the freedom-of-expression interests are already adequately protected in the defamation field by safeguards other than

the quixotic innocent construction rule. The New York Times and

Gertz cases, together with their numerous lower court progeny,

provide substantial protections that did not exist when the Illinois
John case was decided. John was decided two years before the
Fed. Say. and Loan, - Or. App. -,
616 P.2d 1213 (1980). But cf. Fopay v.
Noveroske, 31 Ill. App. 3d 182, 198, 334 N.E.2d 79, 92 (1975) (punitive damages
allowed).
149. "The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of
privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other
means." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6. Oden v. Cahill, 79 Ill. App. 3d 768, 398 N.E.2d
1061 (1979) (Illinois privacy based on federal constitution, state constitution, and
common law of torts). See Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106
N.E.2d 742 (1952).
150. The forms of invasion of privacy recognized in the law are: (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, (b) appropriation of
the other's name or likeness, (c) unreasonable publicity given to the
other's private life; and (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other
in a false light before the public. (See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
sec. 652 A (1971)).
Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 IM.App. 3d 435, 439, 390 N.E.2d 945, 948 (1979).
151. "There has been a good deal of overlapping of defamation in the false
light cases, and it seems clear that either action, or both, will very often lie." W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 813 (4th ed. 1971).
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New York Times case and twelve years before the Gertz case. 152
Therefore, at the time of the John decision, media defendants and
others were not protected from defamation lawsuits filed by public
officials and public figures through a requirement that such plaintiffs prove actual malice; that is, actual knowledge by the defendant of the falsity of the statement, or at least reckless disregard of
the truth or falsity of the statement. 153 Neither were such defendants protected from lawsuits by private plaintiffs through a requirement that at least a minimal standard of negligence had to be
proven. 1 " But such substantial protections of press and speech do
exist now. Furthermore, the innocent construction rule in Illinois is
not infrequently found in a case where the defendant is already
protected by one of the many safeguards defendants have in defamation lawsuits, such as a missing colloquium, a conditional privilege, mere name-calling, non-factual opinion, the truth defense,
and, of course, the New York Times/Gertz doctrine. 15 In these
cases the innocent construction rule takes on the appearance of a
legal appendix that fosters no apparent benefit but is fraught with
potentiality for mischief. Finally, the reasonable construction rule
adequately protects defendants from frivolous defamation lawsuits
because the trial judge still retains all the traditional devices of
summary judgment, directed verdict, and post-trial relief to prevent or undo an unreasonable jury finding that the words in question are defamatory. The reasonable construction rule simply returns the judge/jury demarcation to its normal position where
there is an ambiguity of language. The judge decides whether the
words are capable of the defamatory meaning and the jury decides
whether the words in fact received a defamatory meaning. If a
152. Compare John v. Tribune Co., 24 III. 2d 437, 181 N.E. 2d 105 (1962)
with New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Gertz v. Welch, 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
153. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 347.
154. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. at 347. Under Gertz a private defamation
plaintiff is also not entitled to any presumed actual damage or any punitive damages absent a showing of New York Times actual malice. Id. at 349-50.
155. See, e.g., Hambric v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 46 Ill.
App. 2d 355, 196
N.E.2d 489 (1964) (missing colloquium); Kamsler v. Chicago Ass'n Publishing Co.,
82 Ill. App. 2d 86, 225 N.E.2d 434 (1967) (privilege); Delsis v. Sepsis, 9 Ill.
App.
3d 217, 292 N.E.2d 138 (1972) (name calling); Naked City, Inc. v. Chicago SunTimes, 77 Ill. App. 3d 188, 395 N.E.2d 1042 (1979) (opinion); Altman v. Amoco
Oil Co., 85 Ill.
App. 3d 104 (180) (truth); Korbar v. Hite, 42 Il.App. 3d 636, 357
N.E.2d 135 (1976) (Gertz); and Grabavoy v. Wilson, 87 II. App. 2d 193, 230
N.E.2d 581 (1967) (New York Times).
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newspaper were sued for negligence, an ambiguity of circumstances
that created two competing inferences, one of which supported the
newspaper's position and the other the plaintiff's position, would
without question be considered a jury question. " ' Is freedom of
press and speech in greater danger when a newspaper or other defendant submits to trial by jury in a defamation case than when
the same defendant submits to trial by jury in a negligence case?
In conclusion, the innocent construction rule in Illinois has no
strong root in the common law of the state and its metastasized
spread throughout that common law in recent years is due only to
the John case which seized a rigorous version of the innocent construction rule based on briefs which did not fully elucidate prior
Illinois authorities because of a basic difference relating to whether
the innocent construction rule was even an issue in the case. Significant developments in other states and at the United States Supreme Court level, which were not known or could not have been
known by the John court, require that the innocent construction
rule be again re-examined by the Illinois Supreme Court, especially
where even some members of the Illinois Supreme Court have indicated that the innocent construction paragraph in John is simply
obiter dictum.1 57 The unusually small minority of states which adhere to the innocent construction rule places a strong burden on
those who seek to find some peculiar justification for its survival in
Illinois. 1 8 The realities are that neither reasons of precedent, logic,
or policy are sufficiently strong to overcome that strong presumption against the innocent construction rule. To state a sixteenth
century English case in support of the rule,16 9 when the rule has
156. See, e.g., Carlson v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 50 Ill. App. 3d 748, 365 N.E.2d
1065 (1977).
In negligence cases, the issue of liability should be resolved as a question
of law and verdict directed only when the facts are such that there could

be no difference in the judgment of reasonable men as to inferences to be
drawn from the facts. (citation omitted).
Id. at 753, 365 N.E.2d at 1069.
157. Supra note 90.
158. "[T]he overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions have chosen not to
adopt it. . ." Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 78 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71, 397 N.E.2d
41, 44 (1979). "Admittedly a minority position. . ." Vee See Const. v. Jensen &
Halstead, Ltd., 79 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1086, 399 N.E.2d 278, 279 (1979). Supra
notes 25 and 26.
159. Originally adopted in England as the doctrine of mitior sensus, the
rule is that when the words which form the heart of a defamation suit
can be given two or more meanings, one of which is favorable and not
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long been discarded in England since the eighteenth century at
least,16 is to bring to mind the observation of Oliver Wendell
Holmes:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished
long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of
the past. 61
The Illinois Appellate Court has, perhaps unwittingly, provided
one of the best arguments against the innocent construction rule in
the guise of an argument for the rule when it stated:
The same words uttered in one situation may be universally acknowledged as innocuous, but in another be unchallenged as
amounting to libel or slander. Communication does not occur in a
vacuum or a void-it is employed in the normal course of human
relations. Recognizing this truism, and to place this area of the
law in realistic perspective, Illinois formally adopted the innocent
construction rule in the case of John v. Tribune Co. (citation
omitted). 16
After considering the Illinois innocent construction rule, the
United States Court of Appeals refused to apply it literally: "If we
were to interpret the publication as totally innocent, we would be
reading it as not saying what it actually says (citation omitted)." 13'
The innocent construction rule is in fact an artificial rule that does
defamatory, the court Will construe the words in the favorable sense. See

Case of the Lord Cromwell (1577), 4 Coke Rep. 12b, 76 Eng. Rep. 877,

cited in KALVAN, GREGORY & EPSrEN, TORTS 994-96 (3d ed. 1977).
Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 78 11M.
App. 3d 67, 71, 397 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1979).
160. Supra note 24.
The high regard accorded to the law of defamation is illustrated by the
fact that in England, while trial by jury in civil cases has been largely
abrogated since World War II, it is still preserved in its pristine vigor in
connection with actions for libel or slander. The explanation given for
this distinction is that most civil actions relate only to money, while actions for libel or slander involve honor and reputation, which are to be
considered on a higher level.
Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188, 191 (D.D.C. 1965) (Holtzoff, J.).
161. 0. W. HOLMES, THE HOLMEs READER, "The Path of the Law" 74 (J.
Marke ed. 1955).
162. Sloan v. Hatton, 66 Ill. App. 3d 41, 43-43, 383 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1978).
The argument is similar to that used by Justice Traynor against the innocent
construction rule. Supra note 139 and accompanying text.
163. Continental Nut Co. v. Berner Co., 345 F.2d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 1965).
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consider words in a hypothetical vacuum as though they existed
irrespective of any social context. Indeed the Illinois Appellate
Court, which admonished that under the innocent construction
rule words should be "read in the best possible light, ' ' 16 ' is the
same one which properly revolted when asked to construe the word
"fag" in the innocent sense of a "drudge" rather than in the defamatory sense of "homosexual.""' The court did itself common
sense credit in the case of Moricoli v. Schwartz when it refused to
read the word "fag" in one of the possible innocent senses:
When the words of the statements uttered in the instant case are
given their obvious and natural meaning, we do not see how these
words can be given an innocent construction. Although characterized as "slang," the aforementioned published authority [a dictionary] indicates that the sole occasion upon which the word
"fag" is commonly used in the United States, in the form of a
noun and to connote an adult human being, is with reference to a
homosexual. To suggest otherwise serves only to further tax the
gullibility of the credulous and requires this court to espouse a
naivete unwarranted under the circumstances." '
The linguistic absurdity of the innocent construction rule is perhaps alleviated, but not eliminated, by the suggestion that if words
are given an innocent interpretation only when reasonably susceptible of it, then this part of the rule can be reconciled with the
corollary requirement that the words be given their natural and
obvious meaning. 167 But if the plaintiff had been called "gay" at
the business meeting described in Moricoli, a jury question would
still have been presented even if some would have reasonably
thought that defendant was referring to the cheerful disposition of
the plaintiff. The fact remains that as long as others may have also
reasonably interpreted the remarks to refer to plaintiff's alleged
homosexuality it makes no sense to say words are being given their
164. Makis v. Area Publications Corp., 77 Ill. App. 452, 457, 395 N.E.2d 1185,
1189 (1979). Accord, Wexler v. Tribune Co., 69 Ill. App. 3d 610, 613, 387 N.E.2d
892, 894 (1979). See also Ware v. Carey, 75 Ill. App. 3d 906, 394 N.E.2d 690
(1979): "It is possible that Carey was merely quarreling with Ware's claim that
police corruption did not exist, rather than accusing Ware of protecting corrup-

tion and the syndicate. Accordingly, we are required to hold Carey's statement is
nonactionable." Id. at 920, 394 N.E.2d at 699.
165. Moricoli v. Schwartz, 46 IMI.
App. 3d 481, 361 N.E.2d 74 (1977).
166. Id. at 483, 361 N.E.2d at 76.
167. Makis v. Area Publications Corp., 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 459, 395 N.E.2d
1185, 1190 (1979) (Romiti, J., dissenting). Supra note 132.
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natural and obvious meaning when the innocent meaning must
automatically be taken even though the defamatory meaning is
equally plausible or even more so.
In several recent cases the Illinois Appellate Court has clearly
refused to eliminate or modify the innocent construction rule and
has in fact required that any change must come from the Illinois
Supreme Court. 6 ' A recent Illinois Supreme Court case raises the
hope that this change will occur soon. In Catalano v. Pechous'"
Robert C. Pechous, the city clerk of Berwyn, Illinois allegedly
made the following public statement relating to Berwyn aldermen
who had approved a contract bid for a particular private scavenger
service: "Two hundred forty pieces of silver changed hands thirty for each alderman. 1 70 The appellate court reversed the denial of plaintiffs' summary judgment motion against the city clerk.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the reversal. The court held
that the words could not be given the innocent meaning of mere
political motivation but instead were defamatory because they
charged plaintiffs with the payment of a bribe for the award of a
garbage-collection contract. The Illinois Supreme Court then denied that where words can be treated as either opinion or fact they
must be treated as constitutionally protected opinion under the innocent construction rule. After rebuffing this proposed extension of
the innocent construction rule, the court finally held that the
words in the case were statements of fact that were not to be taken
in a literal sense or made with the precision of a criminal bribery
indictment in order to be actionable. In a separate opinion,
wherein he stated Pechous should have been given a summary
judgment in his favor against plaintiffs, or at least a trial on the
merits, Justice Clark cogently observed:
I note in passing that the majority, in its discussion of
Pechous' intended meaning, has foregone an opportunity to clear
up the confusion over the innocent-construction rule. The rule
has been inconsistently applied and recently ignored in this court
(citations omitted). Nor can the standard announced in Troman,
62 Ill.2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 be reconciled with the standard announced in John v. Tribune Co. (1962), 24 Il.2d 437, 181 N.E.2d
105. If the disregard of stare decisis among judges of appellate
168. Vee See Conat. Co. v. Jensen & Halstead, Ltd., 79 Ill.
App. 3d 1084,
1088, 399 N.E.2d 278, 281 (1979). Accord, Makis v. Area Publications, 77 Ill.
App.
3d 452, 457, 395 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (1979).
169. Ill.2d -, 419 N.E.2d 350 (1980).
170. Id. at 359.
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courts is problematical (citations omitted), surely it is intolerable
to have the innocent-construction rule consistently applied in the
circuit courts
and the appellate courts while it is ignored in this
1
court.

17

By alternately finding that an innocent meaning was not "plausible,' 11 2 then not a "fair reading"17 8 of the words, and finally "not
capable' 4 of an innocent meaning, the Illinois Supreme Court obscured its methodology. Was it saying that no reasonable person
would believe the innocent meaning? If so, this same result could
have more naturally been achieved with an unambiguous expression of the reasonable construction rule. Or was it saying that no
innocent construction was even thinkable? If so, then it is still following the classic innocent construction rule even though Justice
Clark found an innocent construction quite thinkable under the
circumstances.
The inexplicable innocent construction rule is not even consistently being applied at the appellate level. The capriciousness of
the rule among appellate judges is typically revealed in the recent
case of Richardson v. Dunbar.7 1 In Richardson the defendant allegedly asserted in public that the plaintiff "grabbed Danny by the
shoulder and tried to turn him around.' 1 Since Danny was a police officer the plaintiff claimed he was defamed by an implied accusation of aggravated battery under Illinois criminal law. Ignoring
all the innocent construction precedent, and even eschewing mention of the rule, the appellate court simply affirmed the dismissal
thusly: "We find that the construction placed upon Dunbar's
words by the plaintiff is unreasonable and that his complaint was
insufficient to state a claim for defamation.' 7 7 Without waiting for
change by the Illinois Supreme Court the appellate court in Richardson apparently adopted the reasonable construction rule sub
silentio. When the Illinois Supreme Court reassesses the eroded innocent construction rule it should find the rule guilty on three
counts. The rule violates sound precedent, sound logic, and sound
policy. All that remains is for the Illinois Supreme Court to impose
171. Id. at 368-69.

172. Id. at 356.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 359.
175. Ill. App.
176. Id. at 1209.
177. Id. at 1210.

-,

419 N.E.2d 1205 (1981).
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a sentence of capital punishment on innocent construction rule
without any stay of execution.

